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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 12:42 am
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Results for crowd control
31 results foundAuthor: Priks, Mikael Title: Do Surveillance Cameras Affect Unruly Behavior? A Close Look at Grandstands Summary: This paper studies how surveillance cameras affect unruly spectator behavior in the highest Swedish soccer league. Swedish stadiums introduced surveillance cameras at different points in time during the years 2000 to 2001. This natural experiment provides a unique possibility to address problems regarding endogeneity, simultaneous policy interventions and displacement effects. Details: Munich, Germany: CESifo, 2008 Source: CESifo Working Paper No. 2289 Year: 2008 Country: Sweden URL: Shelf Number: 115390 Keywords: CrimeCrowd ControlSurveillance |
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Policing the G20 Protests: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence Summary: The policing of the G20 Protests was a very successful operation; more than 35,000 protesters demonstrated in the center of London with a police presence of several thousand, yet there was a minimum of disruption to the city. Aside from a few high-profile incidents, the policing of the G20 Protests passed without drama. However, these high-profile incidents and the tactics that led to them caused considerable adverse comment and have the potential to seriously damage the public's faith in the police. In addition, it was noted that while the vast majority of officers on duty performed very well, there is concern that untrained and inexperienced officers were placed in such a highly combustible atmosphere. Details: London: The Stationery Office, 2009. 36p.; 79p. Source: Eighth Report of session 2008-09 Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 115746 Keywords: Crowd ControlPolicing Protests (U.K.)ProtestorsRiot Control |
Author: Challenger, Rose Title: Understanding Crowd Behaviors Summary: This practical report provides a comprehensive set of good gractice guidelines for crowd events and management, and for emergency situations and evacuations. It also provides a comprehesive set of good practice guidelines for simulating crowd behaviors, as a useful tool to aid event preparation. The report ends with a number of suggestions for future research so that practice may be improved. The five volumes are: Understanding Crowd Behaviours: A Guide for Readers; Understanding Crowd Behaviours: Guidance and Lessons Identified; Understanding Crowd Behaviours: Simulation Tools; Understanding Crowd Behaviours: Supporting Evidence; and Understanding Crowd Behaviours: Supporting Documentation. Details: York, UK: Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College, 2009. 5 vols. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: Uruguay URL: Shelf Number: 116267 Keywords: Crowd ControlEvent PlanningSporting Events |
Author: Great Britain. Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary Title: Adapting to Protest Summary: The 1st April 2009 was a unique day for the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the policing operation that surrounded the G20 summit was highly effective in significant respects. However, tragic events on the day led to a focus on the police approach to protest, notably the use of containment and the manner in which force was used by police. The death of Ian Tomlinson and other individual complaints are being investigated by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). This review, conducted at the request of the Commissioner of the MPS, concerns the policing methods used on the day. There are lessons to be learnt and issues that merit early consideration for the policing of future public order events during the remainder of the summer. The report made a number of immediate recommendations, including that police: Facilitate peaceful protest; Improve dialogue with protest groups where possible; Improve communication with the public; Moderate impact of containment when used; Improve training to equip officers to deal with the full spectrum of protest activity; and Wear clear identification at all times. Details: London: HMIC, 2009. 107p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 115828 Keywords: Crowd ControlPolicingProtestsRiots |
Author: Holgersson, Stefan Title: Dialogue Police: Experiences, Observations and Opportunities Summary: Dialogue police work is part of the Swedish National Special Police Tactics. During the last five years the Swedish Police have developed methods and approaches to policing situations which are or might become dangerous in everyday police work and at major events through implementing National Police Tactics which build on dialogue, de-escalation and non-confrontation. To handle high risk crowd events Special Police Tactics (SPT) are applied and a national reinforcement organisation consisting of police from the three largest police counties, is used all over the country when needed. The organisation consists of nationally trained commanders, uniformed police officers in mobile units, dialogue police officers, and plainclothes arrest officers and transport units. Through research in different European countries both at high risk demonstrations and football matches earlier perceptions of crowds as always being dangerous has been replaced by modern crowd psychology which focuses on processes within groups and between groups. Through this knowledge special tactics police now consists of an integrated strategie approach based on principles which can prevent and de-escalate conflicts and confrontations: knowledge, facilitation, communication as well as differentiation. By applying these principles self-policing (crowds keeping the order by themselves) can be promoted. These research based conflict reducing principles challenge the police to learn and understand more about the cultural norms of the crowds and their legitimate intentions, to facilitate peaceful protests, to communicate the intentions of the police and when crimes are committed to make interventions discriminately. One crucial factor in the development of Special Police Tactics is the dialogue police function. In this report, the author Stefan Holgersson highlights experiences, observations and possibilities which have emerged mainly during 2002-2007 of the dialogue police function within Stockholm Police Authority. The report is unique as it describes from within the police organization the developments of the dialogue function as the author is a police officer and a researcher. Examples of dialogue work are described to illustrate how the dialogue police functions as a link between the police command and organizers of demonstrations and manifestations before, during and after an event. The work is a long term one, building long term trust and making the police actions transparent and coherent. The dialogue police has an important role in informing demonstrators on how police operations focus on both contributing to peaceful protests and security and on setting limits to what is acceptable in order to avoid personal injuries and riots at major events. In the report Special Police Tactics and dialogue work is related to research and theories within crowd management. Details: Stockholm: Swedish National Police Board, 2010. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 1, 2010 at: http://www.polisen.se/Global/www%20och%20Intrapolis/Informationsmaterial/01%20Polisen%20nationellt/Engelskt%20informationsmaterial/Dialogue_bok100630Webb.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Sweden URL: http://www.polisen.se/Global/www%20och%20Intrapolis/Informationsmaterial/01%20Polisen%20nationellt/Engelskt%20informationsmaterial/Dialogue_bok100630Webb.pdf Shelf Number: 120147 Keywords: Crowd ControlDemonstrations and ProtestsPolicingRiots |
Author: Krahnstoever, Nils Title: Automated Detection and Prevention of Disorderly and Criminal Activities Summary: This document is the final report for the NIJ research program “Automated Detection and Prevention of Disorderly and Criminal Activities”. The goal of this program is to develop methods for automatically detecting and preventing criminal and disorderly activities using an intelligent video system. A particular emphasis of this program is to develop methods that can operate in crowded environments such as prisons, public parks and schools where a large number of people can be present and interact with each other. In addition, the developed technology is going beyond simple motion-based behavior features toward estimating meaningful social relationships between people and groups and use of this information for semantically high-level behavior and scenario recognition. Some of the accomplishments of this program are: (i) a collection of crowd parameter estimation algorithms was developed that allows the system to estimate information such as crowd and group size, crowd density, and group velocity from video; (ii) motion pattern analysis algorithms were developed for detecting low-level group and crowd events such as GROUP FOLLOWING, GROUP CHASING, FAST GROUP MOVEMENTS, and GROUP FORMATION and GROUP DISPERSION; (iii) higher-level behavior recognition algorithms have been developed for detecting and predicting events such as FIGHTING and AGITATION; (iv) an algorithm for automatically controlling a network of PTZ cameras has been developed that enables face detection and face recognition of non-cooperative individuals from a distance; (v) a novel framework for estimating social network structures of groups from video has been developed that enables the system to determine the number of social groups and the leadership structure in small communities automatically; (vi) the system was tested live during the 2009 Mock Prison Riot sponsored by the NIJ as well as evaluated against a large amount of highly-relevant video data that was collected during the same event. The deployed system was demonstrated to law enforcement and correctional staff and received high praise for it’s performance and innovation. Overall this program has led to the development of a wide range of intelligent video capabilities that are highly relevant to law enforcement and corrections. The developed technology can help law enforcement detect many different types of activities and alert operators in many cases about the onset of an event – enabling early detection and possibly prevention of critical events. The system will also allow law enforcement gain insight into the ways that people behave and interact as well as into the social structure behind their interactions. Knowledge about social relationships enables the prediction and detection of challenging group events, such as gang activity and in the future the presence or formation of open-air drug markets. Details: Niskayuna, NY: GE Global Research, 2011. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2011 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/235579.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/235579.pdf Shelf Number: 122641 Keywords: Crowd ControlDisorderly ConductPublic PlacesVideo Surveillance |
Author: Morrell, Gareth Title: The August Riots in England Understanding the Involvement of Young People Summary: In early August 2011, there were outbreaks of significant crime and disorder in some of England’s major cities. The riots and disturbances began in Tottenham in North London on Saturday 6 August following a peaceful protest in response to the police handling of the shooting of Mark Duggan. An apparent incident between a young girl and police sparked clashes which escalated to wide-scale rioting. Windows were smashed and offices, shops and homes set on fire. Looting broke out in the early hours of Sunday in neighbouring Wood Green and Tottenham Hale. Over the course of the next few days, similar disturbances occurred in other parts of London and in other cities. Different areas of London experienced varying levels of violent protest, vandalism and looting. In some areas like Peckham (8 August), clashes between police and groups of largely local young people sparked violence that turned into looting. Events took a different course in other areas, such as around Clapham Junction station in Battersea (8 August). Here, looting by local people, and others from surrounding areas, was not preceded by any significant protest or clashes with police and continued for several hours before police could arrive in sufficient numbers to halt proceedings. Similar events took place outside London. In Birmingham, looting in the city centre followed by clashes between police and rival groups in suburban areas took place across two nights (8–9 August). In Salford (9 August), events followed a similar pattern to Peckham, with initial aggression towards the police developing quickly into looting. NatCen was commissioned by the Cabinet Office to conduct an independent study into the motivations of young people involved in or affected by the riots - the report is the first, and currently only, major study to be based on what young people themselves have to say. The report focuses on the motivations of young people in five areas affected by the riots, and two areas which were not affected by the riots. It analyses how young people's motivations were shaped by a dramatic and unfamiliar set of circumstances. Whilst examining the background to the riots, the report retains a clear focus on the moral and practical decisions made by different people. The study was delivered by an experienced team of qualitative researchers at NatCen who conducted interviews and focus groups with young people, business owners, youth workers and community leaders in affected and non-affected areas, speaking both to those directly involved and those who chose not to be. The evidence-based analysis provides Cabinet Office, wider government departments and the Independent Riots Communities and Victims Panel, with a deeper understanding of the contributing factors for the sequence of events which took place this summer. Details: London: NatCen, 2011. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 4, 2011 at: http://www.natcen.ac.uk/study/the-august-riots-in-england- Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.natcen.ac.uk/study/the-august-riots-in-england- Shelf Number: 123227 Keywords: Crowd ControlDisorderly ConductLootingRiots (U.K.) |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice Title: Law Enforcement Guidelines for First Amendment-Protected Events Summary: As articulated in the United States Constitution, one of the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment is the right of persons and groups to assemble peacefully. Whether demonstrating, counterprotesting, or showing support for a cause, individuals and groups have the right to peacefully gather. Law enforcement, in turn, has the responsibility to ensure public safety while protecting the privacy and associated rights of individuals. To support agencies as they fulfill their public safety responsibilities, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) developed this paper to provide guidance and recommendations to law enforcement officers in understanding their role in First Amendment-protected events. This paper is divided into three areas, designed to provide in-depth guidance for law enforcement. Pre-Event Stage—Discusses how law enforcement will plan for an event or demonstration where First Amendment protections are involved, focusing on the activity that begins when law enforcement leadership learns of an event and must determine the level, if any, of involvement at the event, from both public safety and investigative standpoints. Operational Stage—Focuses on how law enforcement will respond to the event, based on the findings from the Pre-Event Stage, including the development and execution of the Operations Plan. Post-Event Stage—Addresses how and whether information obtained as a result of the event (both during the Pre-Event Stage and Operational Stage) will be evaluated, disseminated, retained, or discarded, as per agency policy. As agencies respond to First Amendment-protected events, law enforcement leadership should be aware of certain “red flag” issues that may arise as they assess whether the agency and personnel should be involved in these events and, if so, what form that involvement should take. As agencies review and understand the concepts and recommendations within this paper, special consideration should be given to these “red flag” issues to ensure that law enforcement agencies and personnel do not infringe on the rights of persons and groups. The purpose of this paper is to provide greater awareness and understanding of the appropriate role of law enforcement in events and demonstrations where First Amendment rights are involved. This paper provides guidance and recommendations to law enforcement officers as they prepare for, respond to, and follow up with events, activities, and assemblies that are protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America. As officers address these types of events, the three-stage process identified in this paper should be incorporated into agency policies, manuals, and/or directives. This process, while focusing on law enforcement’s response to First Amendment events and activities, is not designed to limit the ability of officers to engage in normal criminal investigations or public safety missions. A law enforcement agency may have special rules and procedures governing the levels of review and approval required to engage in preliminary or full investigations or other activities discussed herein; as such, officers should be aware of and understand these rules and procedures. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2011. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 26, 2011 at: http://publicintelligence.net/doj-dhs-law-enforcement-guidelines-for-first-amendment-protected-events/ Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://publicintelligence.net/doj-dhs-law-enforcement-guidelines-for-first-amendment-protected-events/ Shelf Number: 123451 Keywords: Civil DisordersCrowd ControlProtest Demonstrations (U.S.) |
Author: Great Britain. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary Title: The Rules of Engagement: A Review of the August 2011 Disorders Summary: Following the August 2011 riots, the Home Secretary wrote to HMIC to request “further work to support clearer guidance to forces on the size of deployments, the need for mutual aid, pre-emptive action, public order tactics, the number of officers (including commanders) trained in public order policing and an appropriate arrests policy”. HMIC found police need to be better prepared, trained and ready to protect the public if they are to improve upon their response to public disorder. Details: London: HMIC, 2011. 123p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2012 at: http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/a-review-of-the-august-2011-disorders-20111220.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/a-review-of-the-august-2011-disorders-20111220.pdf Shelf Number: 123598 Keywords: Crowd ControlPublic Disorder (U.K.)Public Order ManagementRiots |
Author: Independent Review Board Title: The Baltimore Police Department: Police-Involved Shooting of January 9, 2011 Summary: In the early morning hours of January 9, 2011, Baltimore City police responded to Select Lounge, located at the corner of Franklin and North Paca Streets in the Central Police District, for crowd control and dispersal operations due to disorderly conduct and numerous fights at the location. Upon arrival, on-scene officers’ initial request for additional units was ended shortly thereafter by a "10-32" (sufficient units on scene). However, soon after the “10-32,” the Central District Duty Commander who was on the scene radioed for any free units to respond and assist in closing the club. Over 30 officers responded and began their attempts to control and disperse the crowd. With so many officers responding from a number of different units, managing the incident became difficult, especially after the Central District Commander failed to coordinate and assign units to specific tactical duties or to quickly establish an incident command structure. The lack of overall incident management of an agitated crowd placed the responding officers at risk and contributed to an increasingly chaotic situation. This risk escalated as officers in plainclothes began responding to the scene without a crowd-control strategy in place and without the establishment of an incident command center to direct and control the increasingly complex police operation. Officer William Torbit was on duty in plainclothes that night and responded to the scene minutes after the District Commander’s call was placed for all available units. Officer Torbit began to assist in dispersing the crowd in the parking lot and, in the process, intervened in an altercation in the lot. This altercation led to a fight between Officer Torbit and several of the club patrons, with a number of individuals punching and pushing him to the ground. Apparently unable to get up and finding himself assaulted and stomped by 6-8 individuals, Officer Torbit drew his gun and fired to stop the attack against him. Four uniformed officers rushed into the area of the fight and, not recognizing Officer Torbit, fired at him. After 6 seconds and 42 rounds discharged, the shooting ended, and the uniformed officers quickly realized they had shot a plainclothes police officer. In addition, one of the individuals assaulting Officer Torbit—Sean Gamble—was also shot and killed (likely by Torbit, himself), and four other persons (including a uniformed officer) were wounded. All of the rounds fired were by Officer Torbit and four uniformed officers. The City of Baltimore Mayor’s Office and the Police Commissioner tasked the Independent Review Board (IRB) with examining this police-involved shooting. The Mayor’s Office and the Police Commissioner also asked the IRB to review crowd-control techniques, use of lethal force, deployment of incident command, and the homicide investigation. Appendix A provides a copy of the charge letter with a complete list of tasks for the IRB to complete. CNA was contracted to support the IRB in this process, though the IRB members, themselves, served without compensation. Details: Baltimore: Independent Review Board, 2011. 169p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2012 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/news/2011/Baltimore%20Shooting%20Report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/news/2011/Baltimore%20Shooting%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 124291 Keywords: Crowd ControlIncident ManagementPolice Use of Force (Baltimore)Police-Involved Shooting |
Author: Metropolican Police Service (U.K.) Title: 4 Days in August: Strategic Review into the Disorder of August 2011 Summary: This report details the key issues that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) experienced during the disorders of August 2011 and outlines what went well and what did not, what developments have occurred and further changes that need to be made. In compiling this report the MPS has sought to take a comprehensive view, to provide an accurate reflection of events and identify opportunities to improve as an organisation. Whilst this is the final report of this review, extensive work will continue within the MPS in order to develop its findings and take the recommendations forward under the direction of Assistant Commissioner Specialist Crime and Operations. The MPS has already taken forward a significant amount of work as a result of its review. Findings, areas of work underway and further work commissioned as a result of the review are summarised under themed headings. Details: London: Metropolitan Police Service, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2012 at: http://content.met.police.uk/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheadername1=Content-Type&blobheadername2=Content-Disposition&blobheadervalue1=application/pdf&blobheadervalue2=inline;+filename%3D%22145/595/co553-114DaysInAugust.pdf%22&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1283551523589&ssbinary=true Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://content.met.police.uk/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheadername1=Content-Type&blobheadername2=Content-Disposition&blobheadervalue1=application/pdf&blobheadervalue2=inline;+filename%3D%22145/595/co553-114DaysInAugust. Shelf Number: 125029 Keywords: Crowd ControlPolicing DisorderPublic Disorder (U.K.)Public Order ManagementRiotsRiots (London) |
Author: Frazier Group, LLC Title: Independent Investigation Occupy Oakland Response October 25, 2011 Summary: On October 10, 2011, a group identifying itself as Occupy Oakland set up an encampment in front of Oakland City Hall in Frank Ogawa Plaza Park (FOP Park). The group erected approximately 147 tents, kitchen and restroom facilities, child care areas, posted dozens of banners, and claimed the park as their own. At that time, the City of Oakland sought to accommodate the group in the exercise of their First Amendment rights of expression. However, as time progressed, there were legitimate concerns - mostly supported by evidence - on behalf of city officials for the health, safety and welfare of people in the FOP Park, city employees, and community members. One official who had detailed knowledge of devolving conditions stated "The totality of circumstances was untenable." In short, these concerns included but were not limited to: Health and Welfare - trash and debris were excessive, human and animal waste was observed in excavated holes and buckets, portable bathrooms were too few and un-serviced, rodents were populating the Park, and food preparation and provision were occurring in unsanitary conditions. Safety - illegal and non-permitted electrical hookups were made and structures indicating permanence were erected. Fire inspectors voiced concerns regarding the presence of propane tanks, open-flame cooking, plus cooking and smoking inside tents. A victim who fell from a structure was carried away from the Park for treatment because occupants would not allow fire/medical personnel access. Police officers who attempted to walk through the Park were confronted and told to leave. Attitudes graduated toward aggression and violence. City employees3 were complaining about harassment and concerns for their personal safety. Media reported that a teacher who had occupied the camp was attacked and choked, and a reporter was attacked by a dog and then confronted and told to leave. There were concerns about an alleged sexual assault within the Park, a homeless individual who was beaten with a board, and obvious use of drugs and alcohol. Individuals in the Park felt threatened when they were confronted by groups and told to not communicate with government officials. One government official who attempted to liaison with members of Occupy during a march was told by the marchers he was lucky they did not beat him or spit on him. During the later afternoon hours, the population of the Park increased to the degree where clustering was problematic, tempers flared, arguments ensued, and people within the Park had to intervene to prevent escalation. An effort to identify leadership of Occupy, and then establish a working, collaborative relationship between Occupy and City officials, was a priority of the City from the very early stages of the movement in the Park. A city representative feels that Occupy never allowed this relationship to develop, and in fact Occupy members ensured that it deteriorated over time. City of Oakland Officials became increasingly concerned about conditions within the encampment, and the OPD was directed to develop an eviction plan. On October 25, 2011 beginning at approximately 5:00 AM, 392 OPD and 202 mutual aid personnel responded to 14th and Broadway Streets. Their purpose was execution of the OPD plan to evict the Occupy movement from both FOP Park and from Snow Park. In the early evening, Occupy Oakland clashed with the Oakland Police Department resulting in controversial uses of force, including an incident involving a protestor who was critically injured by a police officer after allegedly being struck in the head by a specialty impact munition and/or a tear gas canister. The Aftermath of October 25th In the wake of these events, serious concerns were raised by both City Officials and by the community at large concerning use of unnecessary force, overall police performance, and OPD’s ability to manage future events in an acceptable manner. The ability of OPD to effectively and impartially investigate the widely reported allegations of police use of force and other misconduct was also questioned. In response to this need for an impartial review of the events of October 25th, the City of Oakland contracted Frazier Group, LLC on December 19, 2011. We are pleased to present the following report, completed under the terms of this contract. Details: Oakland, CA: Frazier Group, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2012 at www2.oaklandnet.com/w/OAK036236 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 125370 Keywords: Crowd ControlDisorderly ConductProtestsPublic DisorderRiots and Disorders (California) |
Author: Hillsborough Independent Panel Title: Hillsborough: The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel Summary: On 15 April 1989 over 50,000 men, women and children travelled by train, coach and car to Hillsborough Stadium, home of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club, to watch an FA Cup Semi-Final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest. It was a sunny, warm, spring day and one of the high points of the English football season. Hillsborough was a neutral venue, like so many stadia of its time a mix of seated areas and modified standing terraces. As the match started, amid the roar of the crowd it became apparent that in the central area of the Leppings Lane terrace, already visibly overcrowded before kick-off, Liverpool fans were in considerable distress. In fact, the small area in which the crush occurred comprised two pens. Fans had entered down a tunnel under the West Stand into the central pens 3 and 4. Each pen was segregated by lateral fences and a high, overhanging fence between the terrace and the perimeter track around the pitch. There was a small locked gate at the front of each pen. The crush became unbearable and fans collapsed underfoot. To the front of pen 3 a safety barrier broke, creating a pile of people struggling for breath. Despite CCTV cameras transmitting images of distress in the crowd to the Ground Control Room and to the Police Control Box, and the presence of officers on duty on the perimeter track, it was a while before the seriousness of what was happening was realised and rescue attempts were made. As the match was stopped and fans were pulled from the terrace through the narrow gates onto the pitch, the enormity of the tragedy became evident. Fans tore down advertising hoardings and used them to carry the dead and dying the full length of the pitch to the stadium gymnasium. Ninety-six women, men and children died as a consequence of the crush, while hundreds more were injured and thousands traumatised. In the immediate aftermath there was a rush to judgement concerning the cause of the disaster and culpability. In a climate of allegation and counter-allegation, the Government appointed Lord Justice Taylor to lead a judicial inquiry. What followed, over an 11-year period, were various different modes and levels of scrutiny, including LJ Taylor’s Interim and Final Reports, civil litigation, criminal and disciplinary investigations, the inquests into the deaths of the victims, judicial reviews, a judicial scrutiny of new evidence conducted by Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, and the private prosecution of the two most senior police officers in command on the day.Despite this range of inquiry and investigation, many bereaved families and survivors considered that the true context, circumstances and aftermath of Hillsborough had not been adequately made public. They were also profoundly concerned that following unsubstantiated allegations made by senior police officers and politicians and reported widely in the press, it had become widely assumed that Liverpool fans’ behaviour had contributed to, if not caused, the disaster.In 2009, at the 20th anniversary of the disaster, Andy Burnham, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, announced the Government’s intention to effectively waive the 30-year rule withholding public records to enable disclosure of all documents relating to the disaster.In July 2009 the Hillsborough Family Support Group, supported by a group of Merseyside MPs, presented to the Home Secretary a case for disclosure based on increasing public awareness of the circumstances of the disaster and the appropriateness of the investigations and inquiries that followed.The Home Secretary met with representatives of the Hillsborough Family Support Group and in January 2010 the Hillsborough Independent Panel, chaired by James Jones, Bishop of Liverpool, was appointed. The remit of the Hillsborough Independent Panel as set out in its terms of reference was to:• oversee full public disclosure of relevant government and local information within the limited constraints set out in the Panel’s disclosure protocol• consult with the Hillsborough families to ensure that the views of those most affected by the tragedy are taken into account• manage the process of public disclosure, ensuring that it takes place initially to the Hillsborough families and other involved parties, in an agreed manner and within a reasonable timescale, before information is made more widely available• in line with established practice, work with the Keeper of Public Records in preparing options for establishing an archive of Hillsborough documentation, including a catalogue of all central Governmental and local public agency information and a commentary on any information withheld for the benefit of the families or on legal or other grounds• produce a report explaining the work of the panel. The panel’s report will also illustrate how the information disclosed adds to public understanding of the tragedy and its aftermath. The structure of the Panel’s Report The Hillsborough Independent Panel’s Report is in three parts. The first part provides an overview of ‘what was known’, what was already in the public domain, at the time of the Hillsborough Panel’s inaugural meeting in February 2010. The second part is a detailed account, in 12 substantial chapters, of what the disclosed documents and other material ‘adds to public understanding’ of the context, circumstances and aftermath of the disaster The third part provides the Panel’s review of options for establishing and maintaining an archive of the documents made available by over 80 contributing organisations in hard copy, many of which have been digitised and are now available online. Finally, the Report includes a set of appendices: the Panel’s full terms of reference; how the Panel has consulted with bereaved families and their representatives and how it responded to well-publicised events during its work; the process of disclosure; and the research methodology adopted in analysing the documents. Details: London: The Stationery Office, 2012. 389p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2012 at: http://hillsborough.independent.gov.uk/repository/report/HIP_report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://hillsborough.independent.gov.uk/repository/report/HIP_report.pdf Shelf Number: 126454 Keywords: Crowd ControlCrowd SecurityHillsborough DisasterSoccer Fields, AccidentsSports (U.K.)Stadiums |
Author: Davies, Toby P. Title: A Mathematical Model of the London Riots and their Policing Summary: In August 2011, several areas of London experienced episodes of large-scale disorder, comprising looting, rioting and violence. Much subsequent discourse has questioned the adequacy of the police response, in terms of the resources available and strategies used. In this article, we present a mathematical model of the spatial development of the disorder, which can be used to examine the effect of varying policing arrangements. The model is capable of simulating the general emergent patterns of the events and focusses on three fundamental aspects: the apparently-contagious nature of participation; the distances travelled to riot locations; and the deterrent effect of policing. We demonstrate that the spatial configuration of London places some areas at naturally higher risk than others, highlighting the importance of spatial considerations when planning for such events.Wealso investigate the consequences of varying police numbers and reaction time, which has the potential to guide policy in this area. Details: London: University College London, 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Scientific Reports: Accessed March 1, 2013 at: http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130221/srep01303/pdf/srep01303.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130221/srep01303/pdf/srep01303.pdf Shelf Number: 127748 Keywords: Crowd ControlLootingPublic DisorderPublic Order ManagementRiots (London, U.K.) |
Author: Seattle Police Department Title: Seattle Police Department. After - Action Review, May Day Events, 05/01/2012 Summary: This report accessed the response of the Seattle Police Department to the May Day events of 2012. On May Day 2012, permitted events included a support for immigration march, additionally there were open source announcements of a protest, a Hip Hop group and other protesters who would then march without a permit. Untimately, people dressed in black did damage to businesses in the downtown core before both ad Mayoral declaration and police action interdicted those bent on destruction. On May Day, officers made arrests for both property damage and assault on Police Officers. Following the event, a May Day Task Force was assembled to review video footage of those who caused damage in an effort to hold them accountable for their crimes. This report presents the report of the Seattle Police Department in response to calls for a review of actions taken by the Department. Details: Seattle, WA: Seattle Police Department, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/MayDay/SPD_After_Action_May_Day_2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/MayDay/SPD_After_Action_May_Day_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 128202 Keywords: Crowd ControlDisorderly ConductProtests and Demonstrations (Seattle, U.S.)Public Order Management |
Author: Hillmann, Michael R. Title: Independent Review Report to the Chief of Police, Seattle Police Department Response to May Day 2012 Summary: This independent review examines the response of the Seattle Police Department to the disturbances which took place during the May Day celebration of 2012. Details: Seattle: Seattle Police Department, 2013. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/MayDay/Hillmann_After_Action_May_Day_2012.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/MayDay/Hillmann_After_Action_May_Day_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 128203 Keywords: Crowd ControlDisorderly ConductProtests and Demonstrations (Seattle, U.S.)Public Order Management |
Author: Jackson, Emily Lindsay Title: Broadening National Security and Protecting Crowded Places - Performing the United Kingdom's War on Terror, 2007-2010 Summary: This thesis critically interrogates the spatial politics of two ‘fronts’ of the UK’s on-going war on terror between 2007-2010: first, broadening national security, the extension of national security into non-traditional social and economic domains; and second, security in ‘crowded places’, counter-terror regimes in the UK’s public spaces. It responds to the neglect within security studies of the spatial politics of this conflict by considering the spatial performativities enabling these two contemporaneous iterations of national security. The first part applies critical geopolitics and biopolitics frameworks to a case study of the new National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. It argues that UK national security reiterates the ‘interconnecting’ performativities of neoliberal norms as a ‘broadening’ understanding of national security which licenses a ‘broadening’ register of coercive policy responses. The second part carries out an exploratory case study of one such coercive policy response: security at the ‘crowded place’ of the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead. It identifies crowded places security as reliant on practices of emptying out and ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive 'zero tolerance' risk imaginaries, and extensive surveillance – both electronic and ‘natural’. In other words, counter-terrorism is becoming increasingly important in shaping daily life in the UK through a diverse range of spatial control practices. The thesis uses an innovative methodological and conceptual strategy combining Foucauldian discourse analysis of security policies, participant observation of situated security practices, with theoretical frameworks from political geography, international relations and visual culture. It also develops Judith Butler’s theory of performativity as a conceptual tool to critique the materialisation of contemporary spaces of security and counter-terrorism, from the meta-imaginative geographies of national security to the micro-spaces of counter-terrorism in UK public space. In sum, this thesis points towards new avenues for understanding the on-going encroachment of the war on terror into everyday spaces in the UK Details: Durham, UK: Durham University, Department of Geography, 2012. 265p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 4, 2013 at: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3498/1/Emily_Lindsay_Jackson_PhD.pdf?DDD14+ Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3498/1/Emily_Lindsay_Jackson_PhD.pdf?DDD14+ Shelf Number: 128666 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrowd ControlNational SecurityPublic Order ManagementPublic SpaceTerrorism (U.K.) |
Author: Northern Ireland. Criminal Justice Inspection Title: A Review of the Criminal Justice System’s Preparedness for Exceptional or Prolonged Public Disorder Summary: This report assesses how the criminal justice system is preparing to deal with the potential of serious, prolonged and widespread disorder associated around controversial parades, the flying of the Union flag, the G8 summit and other significant events which are due to take place in Northern Ireland during the next six months from June 2013. Our history is littered with significant outbreaks of public disorder, which on occasions has verged on anarchy. In response, policing in Northern Ireland has developed a history and tradition for managing the impacts of such violence, and the wider criminal justice system has, to varying degrees, dealt with the eventual consequences. However we are in a different era where successful public sector organisations now invest heavily in developing their strategic planning capability. It is no different for the police, and risk assessment and risk management processes are key influences in developing an overall strategy for dealing with significant events which may result in public disorder. There is an expectation that the strategic planning for such eventualities should be both extensive and up-to-date, and that issues such as capability, capacity and resilience are considered, together with the development of a broad range of contingency plans. This report finds that significant effort is being applied by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in preparation for the forthcoming parading season and specific events. The PSNI has increased its own capacity, and has trained and equipped officers to step up into this specialist activity. In addition, police officers from other parts of the United Kingdom were, at the time of fieldwork, to be deployed in support of the PSNI to deal specifically with the G8 summit. The planning and negotiation required to arrive at this position was extensive and while more work needed to be done prior to the summit, we were satisfied with the progress that had been made. The report highlights the need for an effective response from the wider criminal justice system to support the rule of law and to provide reassurance to the public that the agencies are working together to protect them and deal expeditiously with those who seek to destabilise our society. Details: Belfast: Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, 2013. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed July 9, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 129342 Keywords: Crowd ControlPublic DisorderPublic Order Management (Northern Ireland) |
Author: Vancouver Police Department Title: Vancouver Police Department 2011 Stanley Cup Riot Review Summary: On June 15, 2011, British Columbia’s National Hockey League team, the Vancouver Canucks, played their seventh and final game of the Stanley Cup Finals against the Boston Bruins. The level of local and regional interest in the current Canucks team was unprecedented and likely exceeded the public interest in any event in BC’s history, including the Canucks’ Cup Final years of 1982 and 1994, as well as the 2010 Winter Olympics Men’s Hockey Gold Medal Game. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and the City of Vancouver had created “fan zones” through their Live Site where crowds gathered to watch the game on large screens. Until Game 7, despite challenges, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) policed the series effectively for 24 playoff games and facilitated a safe environment. However, on June 15, there were approximately 55,000 people watching the game in the Live Site and another crowd that peaked at 100,000 people wandered Granville Street as well as the streets and laneways near the Live Site. The crowds were massively larger than what was expected and the level of intoxication and general belligerence was higher than that seen in previous games. This was the first game where individuals came downtown with the intent to start a riot. In the final minutes of the game, fights broke out, bottles were being thrown at the screen and cars were overturned and set on fire. It is generally accepted that the riot broke out at the Live Site location on Georgia Street. Most public attention and media coverage seems to have been focused in this area; however, what is not as commonly known is that a concurrent riot broke out at the intersection of Nelson and Granville Streets. Members of the public and police officers were assaulted by rioters and significant property damage and loss occurred. It is unusual for a sports‐related riot to have two simultaneous flashpoints and this fact could not have been anticipated. The fact that it did occur caused the VPD and its policing partners to respond to the riot on two fronts, thus stretching resources. The VPD, with assistance from other agencies in Metro Vancouver, controlled the situation in approximately three hours without serious injuries or loss of life to the police and the public. This report will examine the events leading up to and during the events of June 15 at the VPD and the City of Vancouver. To develop a complete record of events, the VPD’s Riot Review Team interviewed a total of 115 internal and external officers who were involved in Game 7 and the riot. Furthermore, a de‐brief questionnaire was developed to obtain the feedback of all officers, internal and external, who were directly involved with the events of June 15 and a total of 393 responses were received. Details: Vancouver, BC: Vancouver Police Department, 2011. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2013 at: http://vancouver.ca/files/cov/2011-stanley-cup-riot-VPD.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Canada URL: http://vancouver.ca/files/cov/2011-stanley-cup-riot-VPD.pdf Shelf Number: 129495 Keywords: Crowd ControlHockeyPublic Order MaintenanceRiots and DisturbancesSports Violence (Canada)Stanley Cup |
Author: Narr, Tony Title: Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches Summary: Perhaps there is no greater challenge for police officers in a democracy than that of managing mass demonstrations. It is here, after all, where the competing goals of maintaining order and protecting the freedoms of speech and assembly meet. Police in the United States have a long history of handling mass demonstrations. During the 1960s and throughout the Vietnam War era, American law enforcement was tested time and again on how to best manage mass protest demonstrations. Often the police succeeded brilliantly in peacefully managing hundreds of thousands of demonstrators. At other times, the actions of the police became the unintended focus of protesters and the centerpiece of media coverage of the event. Tough lessons were learned during this period. In the relative calm that followed for almost twenty years, police attention to preparedness for mass demonstration events assumed a lower priority than it had in previous decades. The 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization (WTO) protest changed all that, sending shock waves felt by police agencies around the world. By all accounts, the events that took place in Seattle and the reactions of the police became a vital lesson for police everywhere-learn from this experience or risk repeating it. In fact, then-Chief of Police Norm Stamper came to a Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) meeting shortly after the WTO demonstration and shared the lessons that grew out of Seattle. I recall Chuck Ramsey, Chief of Police in Washington, D.C., and John Timoney, then-commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department (and who later became Chief of Police in Miami), listening carefully to those lessons. Both chiefs would later be tested by major mass demonstration events in their own cities. Since the events in Seattle, we have endured the events of September 11, 2001. These, too, have had an impact on how police handle mass demonstrations. If our concern before focused primarily on out-of-control demonstrators or anarchists, today police executives must be mindful that large-scale events may represent an opportunity for terrorists to carry out their own agenda in a very public and dangerous way. As such, the challenge of policing mass demonstrations highlights a number of issues for today's police executive, including How to effectively manage police resources to deal with large numbers of people who may be either expressing their fundamental constitutional right to protest or who simply are gathering spontaneously after a major sports victory; How to work with business/community members who are not involved in the demonstration/celebration but who have an expectation that the police will protect them and their property from unlawful or destructive behavior; How to effectively gather information for a planned or spontaneous mass demonstration; How to integrate local, state and federal resources- and maintain accountability; How to identify the policy issues and what procedures and safeguards should be in place for mass arrests; Determining what level of force should be used when demonstrators become unruly and who gives the command to use it; and n Clarifying the role of the agency's chief executive before, during and after an event. Who is in charge of managing the demonstration? These questions and many more are the focus of this publication. This report is not so much a detailed, operational guide as it is an overview of the major issues to consider when planning the police role in managing a mass demonstration. While most police chiefs will be aware of a great many of the issues raised, this report sheds light on a number of issues that are not as easily recognized for their potential to derail the efforts of police. Our hope is to offer police executives and operational commanders a snapshot of lessons already learned and a roadmap through the steps they will take in preparation for future major mass demonstration events. This report is part of the PERF Critical Issues publication series, and we are very grateful for Motorola, Inc.'s, support of this effort. We are especially grateful to the police chiefs and their staffs who contributed their time and ideas to this project. Details: Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2006. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2014 at: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/police%20management%20of%20mass%20demonstrations%20-%20identifying%20issues%20and%20successful%20approaches%202006.pdf Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/police%20management%20of%20mass%20demonstrations%20-%20identifying%20issues%20and%20successful%20approaches%202006.pdf Shelf Number: 130801 Keywords: Crowd ControlDisorderly ConductMass DemonstrationsRiots and Public Disorder |
Author: Prouse, Carolyn Title: Framing the World cUPP: Competing Discourses of Favela Pacification as a Mega-Event Legacy in Brazil Summary: In November of 2010, Brazilian military and police officers rolled through the streets of Complexo de Alemao, Rio de Janeiro's largest favela, in an effort to 'take back' the community from notorious drug traffickers in time for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Given the pervasive rhetoric that the occupation of favelas by the 'pacifying' Unidade de Policia Pacificadora (UPP) program is for these mega events, what are the effects of this framing, and how is it used and contested by multiple actors? What subjects are called into being as a 'threat' through discourses regarding the UPPs, and how does this rhetoric legitimate violent practices of security by the state? Employing Judith Butler's concepts of framing and the constitutive outside, I argue that there are multiple and competing discourses that frame UPP military police interventions, which have important legacy ramifications for Brazil's mega events. In general, many international popular media accounts highly decontextualize and exoticize the space of the favela, constituting a site of threatening, yet consumable, Otherness. The state tends to construct simplistic dichotomies of space and subjects as threatening in order to legitimate its own actions. However, many favela inhabitants are reframing these constitutions to undermine the state's attempts at legitimation and bring into relief the historical and socio-political continuities of Brazilian militarization. Details: RASAALA, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2012): 17 p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 21, 2014: https://journal.lib.uoguelph.ca/index.php/rasaala/article/view/2219/2714 Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: https://journal.lib.uoguelph.ca/index.php/rasaala/article/view/2219/2714 Shelf Number: 132723 Keywords: Crowd ControlDrug TraffickingFavelas (Brazil)MilitarizationSlumsSporting Events |
Author: Amnesty International Title: The Human Rights Impact of Less Lethal Weapons and Other Law Enforcement Equipment Summary: Law enforcement agencies around the world regularly misuse so-called "less-lethal" weapons and equipment for torture and their use can also have deadly consequences, Amnesty International and the Omega Research Foundation said as they launched a new briefing at the United Nations Crime Congress in Doha, Qatar. The Human Rights Impact of Less Lethal Weapons and Other Law Enforcement Equipment details the medical and other risks associated with a wide range of weaponry and equipment used in policing, including crowd control during demonstrations, as well as in prisons. And it recommends stricter controls or, in some cases, bans to stem future abuses. Amnesty International and Omega acknowledge the importance of developing less-lethal weapons, equipment and technologies, to reduce the risk of death or injury inherent in police use of firearms and other existing weapons. When used responsibly by well-trained and fully accountable law enforcement officials, less-lethal weapons can prevent and minimize deaths and injuries to assailants, suspects and detainees, as well as protect the police and prison officers themselves. But such equipment can have damaging and even deadly effects if it is not used in compliance with international human rights law and standards. It can also have a particularly harmful impact on some people, including the elderly, children, and pregnant women, or those with compromised health. Amnesty International has documented how law enforcement officials commit a wide range of human rights violations using such equipment - including torture and other ill-treatment in custody, as well as excessive, arbitrary and unnecessary use of force against demonstrators. The briefing covers five categories of equipment: Restraints: thumb cuffs, fixed cuffs, leg irons and restraint chairs; Kinetic impact devices: police batons and other striking weapons, spiked batons and kinetic impact projectiles including plastic bullets, rubber bullets, baton rounds and bean bag projectiles; Riot control agents: chemical irritants such as tear gas and pepper spray, including those dispensed from fixed installation dispensers; Electric shock devices: Tasers and other projectile electric shock devices, stun batons, stun shields and body-worn electric shock equipment such as stun belts; Acoustic devices and other technologies used to disperse crowds: audible sound wave technology that emits a deterrent noise, as well as water cannon. In cases where the items have a legitimate use, the organizations recommend controls to prevent their misuse. In the case of new technology which is not yet adequately tested, suspension pending further research by independent experts is recommended. Lastly, the organizations call for prohibitions on equipment which has no legitimate purpose which cannot be achieved by safer alternatives. Less-lethal weapons and restraints have developed considerably since the adoption of some international human rights standards relevant to law enforcement. For example, since the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms were adopted in 1990, a range of ever more advanced weaponry and other technologies have come into use by law enforcement agencies around the world. With the exception of the USA and the European Union, the trade in security and law enforcement equipment is either unregulated or subject to laxer restrictions than the trade in conventional weapons. Amnesty International and Omega are calling for stricter controls, including a licensing system for transfers of law enforcement equipment to safeguard against its potential abuse by the end user. Details: London: AI, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2015 at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_impact_less_lethal_weapons_doha_paper.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_impact_less_lethal_weapons_doha_paper.pdf Shelf Number: 135374 Keywords: Crowd ControlPolice Use of ForcePolice WeaponsTasers |
Author: CNA Analysis & Solutions Title: Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies Summary: When law enforcement executives are tasked with managing a large event, they can maximize their efforts by learning from other agencies and adopting proven practices. Too often, however, past lessons learned are not documented in a clear and concise manner. To address this information gap, the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance worked in partnership with CNA to develop this planning primer. This planning primer synthesizes salient best practices pertaining to security planning for a large-scale event, specifically pre-event planning, core event operations, and post-event activities. The planning primer includes detailed information on 18 core operational areas that law enforcement executives can give to lead law enforcement planners as supplemental guidance. This guidance can be used as a foundation for coordinating area-specific operational plans and can be modified to accommodate event security requirements and existing protocols. Furthermore, supplementing each operational area presented in the planning primer are actionable templates, checklists, and key considerations designed to facilitate the planning process. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: https://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Planning-Primer.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Planning-Primer.pdf Shelf Number: 129782 Keywords: Crowd ControlDemonstrationsEmergency PreparednessPublic DisorderRiots |
Author: Hamilton-Smith, Niall Title: An evaluation of section 1 of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 Summary: This summary sets out key findings from a multi-method research study to evaluate the implementation and impact of new powers introduced in Section 1 of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012. The research aimed to provide evidence as to the Act‟s impact on disorder and offensive behaviour at football matches. Research Objectives The objectives for the research as outlined in the Scottish Government research specification document were as follows: To assess the implementation of the legislation and to identify any barriers that may be impeding its effectiveness; To evaluate whether the atmosphere and behaviour at and around football matches has improved since the introduction of the Act; Relatedly, to assess whether the Act has also resulted in a reduction in offending at and around football matches; and finally, To examine supporters‟ perception of the legislation, in terms of their understanding of its content and acceptance of its objectives. Research Methods The key elements of the mixed methods study were: Two online surveys of supporters of Scottish football clubs were conducted as part of the study. The first survey was "live‟ between 20 August and 20 September 2013, the second between 22 July and 5 August 2014. The surveys of Supporters Direct Scotland members and other football supporters may be considered a reasonable basis for hypothesizing about the views of Scottish football supporters in general. In terms of sample characteristics, the vast majority were male, white and born in Scotland. There was greater diversity in terms of age. Responses were received from all 42 SPFL clubs, with the four largest Glasgow and Edinburgh clubs the best represented in the 2014 survey. There was a fairly even split between season ticket holders and non-season ticket holders. Interviews and focus groups with those involved in the implementation and enforcement of the legislation, including Sheriffs, Procurators Fiscal, Police Officers, and Club Security Officials. Meetings and focus groups with football fans and with representatives of supporters groups. Analysis of secondary data sources, including data held by the Crown Office, the Scottish Government and Police Scotland. Some limited observational research and informal interviewing in and around stadia on match days was also undertaken. Details: Edinburgh: Scottish Government, 2015. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Scottish Government Social Research Series: Accessed August 14, 2015 at: http://www.sccjr.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Evaluation-of-S1-of-OBAFATBSA.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.sccjr.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Evaluation-of-S1-of-OBAFATBSA.pdf Shelf Number: 136410 Keywords: Crowd ControlFootball FansSoccerSports Violence |
Author: Gilmore, Joanna Title: Report on the Policing of the Barton Moss Community Protection Camp: November 2013 - April 2014 Summary: In a collaboration between the University of York's Centre for Urban Research (CURB) and LJMU's Centre for the Study of Crime, Criminalisation and Social Exclusion (CCSE), researchers investigated the policing of Barton Moss Community Protection Camp in Salford, Greater Manchester. From November 2013 to April 2014, the camp promoted a campaign of peaceful protest to raise awareness of the potential environmental dangers of exploratory hydraulic fracturing (fracking) taking place in the area. Protest activities included 'slow walking' in front of vehicles accessing the site and other forms of non-violent direct action, as well as rallies, hosting music events, and family days. Amid conflicting media accounts of violence attributed to both protestors and Greater Manchester Police (GMP), researchers at York and LJMU made a series of visits to the camp, conducted interviews with camp residents and analysed figures from ongoing criminal justice cases of those arrested. The research aimed to provide a rare insight into the experiences of anti-fracking protesters. The report is grounded in the experiences of camp residents and supporters, and the researchers concluded that independence from GMP in this research was essential to their gaining access to the camp and the lawyers involved in the ongoing cases. Documenting concerns about the nature, function and proportionality of the policing operation at the camp, and the deployment of policing methods, the peer-reviewed report provides a range of findings and recommendations. These include: - The protest at Barton Moss was overwhelmingly peaceful and non-violent - The nature and scale of the policing operation was found to be disproportionate to the activities of the camp. Policing tactics had the effect of undermining the rights of those protesting peacefully, meaning GMP failed in their obligation to facilitate peaceful protest as stated by the European Convention on Human Rights. - GMP officers - from planning stages to conclusion - prioritised the commercial interests of the fracking company over the right of local residents and supporters to exercise their right to protest - The communication strategy of GMP focused primarily on justifying the policing operation and questioning the legitimacy of the protest rather than providing the public with clear information about the protest and policing operation. - The overwhelming majority (98 percent) of arrests made at Barton Moss were for non-violent offences. These figures cast doubt on the legitimacy of GMP's characterisation of the protest in public statements made during the policing operation. - Two thirds (66 percent) of arrested protesters have had their cases dropped, dismissed or been found not guilty by the courts. This conviction rate is significantly lower than that occurring within the criminal justice system as a whole. - Police bail powers were routinely abused in order to restrict the right to protest - Overall, the cumulative impact of these processes showcases the routine abuse of police powers at the expense of protesters' civil liberties Details: Centre for the Study of Crime, Criminalisation and Social Exclusion, Liverpool John Moores University Centre for URBan Research (CURB), University of York, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 15, 2016 at: https://curbyork.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/bm_final_170216_email.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://curbyork.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/bm_final_170216_email.pdf Shelf Number: 138244 Keywords: Crowd ControlOffenses Against the EnvironmentProtestsPublic DisorderPublic Order Management |
Author: Physicians for Human Rights Title: Lethal in Disguise: The Health Consequences of Crowd-Control Weapons Summary: In recent years, there has been a rise in the number of popular protests in which people have taken to the streets to express grievances and claim their rights. In many cases, police and security forces have responded in ways that profoundly undermine the fundamental rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression, often leading to escalations in violence through unwarranted, inappropriate, or disproportionate uses of force. Law enforcement throughout the world is increasingly responding to popular protests with crowd-control weapons (CCWs). The proliferation of CCWs without adequate regulation, training, monitoring, and/or accountability, has led to the widespread and routine use or misuse of these weapons, resulting in injury, disability, and death. There is a significant gap in knowledge about the health effects of CCWs and an absence of meaningful international standards or guidelines around their use. As a result, the International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations (INCLO) and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) partnered to document the health consequences of CCWs and examine their roles and limitations in protest contexts and make recommendations about their safe use. This report aims to raise awareness about the misuse and abuse of CCWs, the detrimental health effects that these weapons can have, and the impact of their use on the meaningful enjoyment of freedom of assembly and expression. We also seek to foster a global debate to develop international standards and guidelines. Ultimately, our goal is to prevent injury, disability, and death by providing information about CCWs and insisting on their safe use. The misuse of CCWs and the human rights concerns that arise from this misuse are the result of a number of factors, the most significant of which are: gaps in international standards and regulations; insufficient testing, training, and regulations; a rapidly-growing industry; and a lack of accountability. There are many flagrant examples of the misuse of CCWs, some of which are documented in case studies included in this report. In Kenya, five children and one police officer were injured in a stampede resulting from tear gas being fired directly at schoolchildren protesting the seizure of a playground. In the United States, police intervention in the Black Lives Matter protests included the indiscriminate use of tear gas, disorientation devices, acoustice devices, beanbag rounds, and rubber bullets. In Egypt, a police officer was caught on video deliberately firing pellets at protesters' upper bodies in order to maximise injury. These troubling case studies, and others, are included throughout this report to put the medical evidence into context. The report examines six kinds of CCWs used internationally: kinetic impact projectiles (KIPs), chemical irritants, water cannons, disorientation devices, acoustic weapons, and directed energy devices. The health effects of kinetic impact projectiles and chemical irritants are described in significant detail; these are the two weapon types about which there is a critical mass of data to analyse. The following systematic reviews evaluated published and grey literature released between January 1, 1990 and March 31, 2015. Details: New York: Physicians for Human Rights and INCLO, 2016. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 21, 2016 at: https://ccla.org/cclanewsite/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WEAPONREPORT_FINAL_WEB_PAGES.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://ccla.org/cclanewsite/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/WEAPONREPORT_FINAL_WEB_PAGES.pdf Shelf Number: 138346 Keywords: Crowd ControlCrowd ManagementDisorderly ConductPolice Use of ForcePublic DisordersPublic Order ManagementRiots |
Author: Bruce, David Title: Commissioners and commanders: Police leadership and the Marikana massacre Summary: This monograph examines the functioning of the police system, with a focus on the leadership and command levels, in the build-up to the Marikana massacre on 16 August 2012, when police killed 34 miners who were striking at the Lonmin platinum mine at Marikana. It considers events up to about 15:30 on Thursday, 16 August, which is when police launched their tactical intervention during which the massacre took place. The monograph examines decision making and the exercise of authority and influence by senior leadership of the South African Police Service (the SAPS), particularly the senior national and provincial leaders (National Commissioner Phiyega and North West Provincial Commissioner Zukiswa Mbombo), and senior SAPS commanders (Major Generals Mpembe and Annandale). The key findings of the Marikana Commission are summarised, followed by an overview of the conflict at the mine in August 2012. This conflict involved the strikers, mine management and two unions, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). The monograph outlines some of the aspects of this conflict, including questions about the political alignment of the parties involved and how the strike, launched on Thursday 9 August, rapidly escalated into violence. The monograph then focuses on two critical shifts in the SAPS approach to the Marikana situation. Both these shifts were linked to the involvement of SAPS senior leaders, Phiyega and Mbombo, and are likely to have been influenced by their interactions with Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa. The first shift was on Monday, 13 August, after two SAPS members were killed by strikers. The strike then became the focus of intense national political and media attention; national police commanders, planners and units were brought in and Public Order Police (POP) commanders were marginalised from the command system. The second shift was a decision made on Wednesday, 15 August, that police would take action against the strikers on the following day if the strikers refused to disarm. The section on operational matters focuses on some of the nuts and bolts of the operation. A discussion of the planning of the intervention is relevant to examining how the police understood the situation they were confronting. This is followed by an analysis of the negotiation process that focused on persuading the strikers to disarm. It examines the fact that the strikers refused to disarm unless Lonmin negotiated with them. The SAPS conveyed the strikers’ message to Lonmin but refrained from exerting any pressure on Lonmin to comply with the strikers' request. This section of the monograph examines how the decision taken by SAPS senior leadership on Wednesday, 15 August affected both the planning and negotiations processes. It also informs the analysis of the actions of the SAPS commanders that follows. The penultimate section of the monograph focuses on the role the two senior commanders, Mpembe and Annandale, played in the operation before the tactical intervention. It explores the role they played in implementing the decision that had been made by the SAPS senior leadership that Wednesday, and whether they exercised their authority appropriately in this respect. The conclusion draws together this discussion with a focus on questions raised in the monograph about the SAPS commanders at Marikana. It recognises that their actions were affected not only by the senior leadership decision made on Wednesday but also by shifts in the nature of the operation that took place on the Monday prior to this. These not only created ambiguity about what type of operation was being conducted but also resulted in a blurring of lines of authority. The monograph ends by highlighting key issues raised, including: • Police positioning in relation to social conflict and the potential impact of political pressure. • Ensuring that senior leaders of the SAPS, as well as other people in leadership roles, are appropriately qualified. • The nature of decision making in the SAPS. • How leadership and command are exercised in large-scale public order and crowd management operations as well as minimum standards for ensuring that such operations are carried out professionally and conform with crowd management principles. • The need for the SAPS to recognise the principle that, in actions by the police where the use of lethal force is anticipated police should seek to resolve situations effectively while minimising the potential for having to use lethal force. The principle applies to all police actions of this kind and not only to crowd management. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph No. 194: Accessed February 13, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono194-2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: South Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono194-2.pdf Shelf Number: 140903 Keywords: Crowd ControlPolice AdministrationPolice BehaviorPolice Decision-MakingPolice PerformancePolice Use of ForcePublic Disorder |
Author: Straub, Frank Title: Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department's Fourth Precinct Summary: Summary of events On the morning of November 15, 2015, two Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers were dispatched to an assault call in a North Minneapolis neighborhood just blocks from the police department's Fourth Precinct station. Soon after arriving on scene, the officers fatally shot Jamar Clark. Following the shooting, community members marched to and organized outside the Fourth Precinct police station. Over the course of the next 18 days-from November 15 through December 3, 2015- demonstrators occupied the lawn and street in front of the Fourth Precinct. For the first three days, a group of demonstrators also occupied the front vestibule of the Fourth Precinct station. The street and the surrounding neighborhood were the site of demonstrations, open fires, noisy gatherings, and encampments. The demonstrators called for police reform, and specifically for the release of video footage from the officer-involved shooting. In the early morning hours of December 3, the occupation was successfully and peacefully resolved. After 18 days, the community response was mixed: while the large majority applauded the professionalism and restraint of the Fourth Precinct line officers, some perceived the response as overly-aggressive and unnecessarily forceful, and others questioned why the occupation was allowed to continue for 18 days. Ultimately, the total cost to the city was approximately $1.15 million. The majority of the expenses were for MPD overtime; however, there were also expenses for replacing and repairing barriers and fencing, squad repairs, and hardware replacements. Approximately $50,000 of costs to the city were in property damage. There were five injuries caused by a group of alleged White supremacists who shot into the crowd of demonstrators; however, no serious injuries were attributed to interactions between MPD officers and demonstrators. Implications and challenges Like every significant incident, the occupation posed a unique set of circumstances for city and MPD leaders-circumstances that were unpredictable and rapidly evolving. Significant challenges were associated with managing the demonstrators; the media; and the impacts of the occupation on the surrounding neighborhood, MPD employees, and their families. These issues were compounded by a police department that struggled with the command and control structure and fully implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS), inconsistent communication, and training and equipment deficiencies. City leaders and MPD officials worked to maintain the First Amendment rights of the demonstrators while ensuring their safety, the safety of police officers, and the safety of the community as a whole. They were determined to bring a peaceful end to the occupation in a difficult national environment marred by civil disturbances spurred by officer-involved incidents in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York, and other cities nationwide. For city and law enforcement leaders, this environment reinforced their determination to exercise extreme caution throughout the response. In the end, the city and its police department brought the occupation to a peaceful conclusion and avoided the civil disturbances that occurred in other cities. Public safety response Officers throughout the MPD demonstrated extraordinary resilience and professionalism in their response to the occupation. Many officers worked long shifts and were subjected to verbal, and in some cases physical, assault. At various times, bottles, bricks, Molotov cocktails, bottles of gasoline, and other things were thrown over perimeter fences, threatening officers and damaging police vehicles and the precinct building. During the occupation, Fourth Precinct officers were instructed not to leave the building during their shifts except to provide perimeter security. Meals were brought into the station by chaplains and other volunteers. The commitment of the city, the police department, and individual officers to a peaceful, measured response played a large role in keeping the occupation from escalating into violent riots. Key themes of the review This COPS Office Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the 18-day occupation of the front lawn and the street in front of the MPD Fourth Precinct, completed by the Police Foundation, provides a comprehensive overview of the occupation from the perspectives of the MPD, elected leaders, demonstrators, and community members. The CIR identifies findings and recommendations as they relate to the response in Minneapolis, but apply more generally to civil disturbances across the nation. While the authors understand the unique set of circumstances that surround the protests and occupation of the Fourth Precinct, they also understand that the decision-making framework for the police response to this incident can and should be reviewed within the context of other significant incidents to identify important lessons that can be applied if a similar event occurs in another city, as well as to critical incidents more generally. The findings and recommendations in this report center on leadership; command and control; response to civil disorder; accountability and transparency; internal communications; public information and media; use of force; intelligence gathering; training; equipment and tools for managing demonstrations; officer safety, wellness, and resilience; and community engagement and relationships. Some of the key lessons learned include the following: -- Clearly define leadership roles and responsibilities among elected officials, law enforcement, and other agencies to ensure a coordinated and collaborative response to civil disturbance and other critical incidents. Strained relationships, lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities, public disagreements, and lack of consistent internal communication contributed to the dynamic and varied response to this protracted incident. Unified leadership from elected officials, police executive and command staffs, and precinct personnel provides the foundation upon which a cohesive tactical and operational response is built and executed. -- Plan and exercise the unified command system for complex incidents during routine public safety response and operations. A citywide understanding and familiarization with NIMS and ICS is necessary during civil disturbances and other critical incidents to ensure coordination and collaboration among all responding agencies and individuals. Consistent implementation of unified command system principles in response to routine events and pre-planned large-scale events builds confidence in the systems and facilitates their implementation in response to mass demonstrations and critical incidents. -- Clear, concise, and consistent communication, particularly during critical incidents, is key to establishing trust and credibility. Clear, concise, and consistent communication between the Mayor's Office and the MPD, between elected officials, and within the MPD regarding the overall strategy would have led to a more coordinated and collaborative response to the occupation, provided context to the operational and tactical decisions that were made, addressed officer safety concerns, and positively impacted morale. -- Prioritize officer safety, wellness, morale, and resilience before, during, and after a critical incident such as a protracted response to civil disturbance. City and MPD leaders should have addressed and more fully accounted for the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of officers assigned to respond to the 18 days of protests, demonstrations and occupation. -- Build on positive police-community relationships to help mitigate potential future critical incident responses. The MPD 2.0 model, the training and engagement being done as part of the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice, and the emphasis on positive interactions and fostering trusting partnerships should continue. Understanding and acknowledging the deep-seated racial and other issues, particularly in North Minneapolis, and building and fostering relationships with traditional and emerging community leaders will be instrumental in learning from the occupation and building opportunities to address areas of community tension and discord. Conclusion Many of the findings and recommendations that resulted from the 18-day occupation and the MPD.'s response build on an existing body of knowledge that can assist law enforcement agencies in their mission to protect, serve, and strengthen relationships with their communities. Given the unprecedented nature of the occupation, we hope that the lessons in this report will provide guidance to other agencies that may encounter similar events in the future and add to the growing body of literature that public safety agencies can use to enhance their preparation for, and response to, civil disturbances in their communities. Details: Washington, DC: U..S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Policing Services, 2014. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 22, 2017 at; https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Maintaining-First-Amendment-Rights-and-Public-Safety-in-North-Minneapolis.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Maintaining-First-Amendment-Rights-and-Public-Safety-in-North-Minneapolis.pdf Shelf Number: 146342 Keywords: Critical Incident ManagementCrowd ControlDemonstrationsOfficer-Involved ShootingPolice ProceduresPublic DemonstrationsPublic DisorderPublic SecurityRiots |
Author: Amnesty International Netherlands Title: Policing Assemblies Summary: A public assembly is a dynamic social process which often starts long before the actual assembly takes place. However, in particular when public assemblies turn into violence, what is usually seen is a photograph or a video of law enforcement officials (LEOs) and demonstrators clashing in some way. Such a picture gives only a one-dimensional idea of what happened. This paper aims to provide those who wish to monitor or analyse public assemblies - e.g. human rights and other civil society organisations, or journalists - with a broader view about them. It aims to provide them with an understanding about the planning and preparatory process undertaken by law enforcement agencies and enable them to identify causes and failures throughout the process where things may have gone wrong. It should in the end enable them to formulate constructive recommendations for the future which go beyond simply the necessary response of calling for investigation of incidents and bringing to justice those who commit human rights violations or abuses. Details: Amsterdam: Amnesty International Netherlands, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Police and Human Rights Programme - Short paper series no. 1: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.amnesty.nl/actueel/short-paper-series-no-1-policing-assemblies Year: 2013 Country: Netherlands URL: https://www.amnesty.nl/actueel/short-paper-series-no-1-policing-assemblies Shelf Number: 149681 Keywords: Crowd ControlDemonstrationsHuman Rights |
Author: Gilmore, Joanna Title: Keep Moving! Report on the Policing of the Barton Moss Community Protection Camp, November 2013-April 2014. Summary: This report contains interim indings from research into the policing of the Barton Moss Community Protection Camp at Barton Moss, Salford, Greater Manchester, conducted by researchers from Liverpool John Moores University and the University of York. he camp was in place from November 2013 until April 2014 for the duration of the exploratory drilling operation conducted by energy company IGas Energy at Barton Moss. Camp residents and supporters engaged in a campaign of protest and direct action to raise awareness about the apparent dangers of hydraulic fracturing - better known as fracking - at Barton Moss. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) conducted a policing operation - codenamed Operation Geraldton - at Barton Moss over the course of the drilling operation conducted by IGas. he report draws upon interviews conducted by the authors with camp residents and those taking part in direct action. It also collates, and draws upon, social media and other media reporting on the Barton Moss camp, as well as other publicly available information such as public statements, press releases, and responses to requests for information made by the authors under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to relevant public bodies, including Greater Manchester Police. he report documents concerns about the nature, function and proportionality of the policing operation at the camp and the way that policing methods were deployed in accordance with the obligations to facilitate peaceful protest underpinned by the European Convention on Human Rights. his report raises serious questions about the proportionality of arrest patterns and bail conditions, as well as the dominant media and public portrayal of the protest and the protesters, including the role played by GMP in inluencing this portrayal. he report documents protesters' experiences of violence and harassment by the police including gendered violence experienced by women involved at the camp. Particular attention is drawn to the role of Tactical Aid Unit oicers in the policing of protest marches, and the role of senior oicers in the communication and public information strategies conducted as part of Operation Geraldton. Ultimately, the report highlights the various procedures adopted by GMP in the management of the protest that had the efect of curtailing the right to protest, and seeks to substantiate unacknowledged claims that the policing operation was violent, disproportionate to the size and peaceful nature of the protest, and carried out with impunity. his research raises important questions about the nature of democratic accountability and public order policing in England and Wales. Details: Liverpool, UK: Centre for the Study of Crime, Criminalisation and Social Exclusion, Liverpool John Moores University' York: Centre for Urban Research (CURB), University of York, 2016. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2018 at: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/115146/1/Barton_Moss_Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/115146/1/Barton_Moss_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 149839 Keywords: Crowd ControlDemonstrationsPolice MisconductProtests and DemonstrationsPublic Order Management |
Author: Jordan, Mark Title: Contextualising and Comparing the Policing of Public Order in France and Britain Summary: France and Britain are European neighbours with distinct policing styles and traditions reflected in their differing approaches to public order policing. This thesis examines and compares this policing discipline in these countries. Focusing on the institutional and operational dimensions within their historical, social and political contexts, it identifies convergence and divergence of approaches. Using an enhanced version of David Waddington's 'Flashpoints' model as an analytic framework, the thesis adopts a mainly qualitative approach, drawing data from a review of relevant literature, semi-structured 'elite' interviews, participant observations and case studies. A number of key findings are produced, based on the assumption that a state must possess an effective policing function for it to honour its sovereign and civic responsibilities. Details: Cardiff, Wales: Cardiff University, 2012. 284p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 22, 2018 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/cnmcs-plcng/rsrch-prtl/dtls-en.aspx?d=PS&i=85628845 Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/cnmcs-plcng/rsrch-prtl/dtls-en.aspx?d=PS&i=85628845 Shelf Number: 153057 Keywords: Crowd ControlPublic Disorder Public Order Management Public Order Policing Riots |